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Spain’s transport infrastructure policy has become a paradigmatic 
case of oversupply and of mismatch with demand. The massive 
expansion of the country’s transport infrastructure over the last 
decade has not been a response to demand bottlenecks or 
previously identified needs. For this reason, the intensity of use 
today on all interurban modes of transport in Spain falls well 
below that of other EU countries. This paper analyzes the 
institutional and regulatory factors that have permitted this 
policy, allowing us to draw lessons from the Spanish case that 
should help other countries avoid the pitfalls and shortcomings 
of Spanish policy. Based on our analysis, we also discuss policy 
remedies and suggest reforms in different regulatory areas, which 
could help improve the performance of Spain’s infrastructure 
policy. 
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1. Introduction
Spain’s infrastructure policy over the last decade has been characterized by an almost 
overwhelming degree of public investment that has, however, been largely unrelated to current or 
prospective demand. This situation has affected all interurban modes of transport. Indeed, the 
country’s policy managed to exacerbate the mismatch between supply and demand well before 
the economic crisis set in and provoked further reductions in demand. The reality of the situation 
is even acknowledged in the current Transport Infrastructure Plan (PITVI, 2012), in a section 
devoted to conducting a policy diagnosis [Part II, p. 57]: “Nonetheless, in recent years planning 
has focused on, and given priority to, the continued expansion of the system’s supply without any 
direct correlation existing with growth in demand”. Paradoxically, at around the same time, the 
drafter of the Plan, Ana Pastor, Minister of Public Works and Transport, was recorded as saying in 
a speech in favor of maintaining government plans for extending the high-speed rail (HSR) 
nationwide: “I don’t want an asymmetric Spain (…) How do I explain to the Spaniards that the 
people of one region are more important than those of another”.1
Indeed, even in the throes of the current economic crisis, the Spanish government 
continues to spend large amounts of resources on its HSR (c. 3,300 million euro in 2013, 
amounting to 33% of total central investment in transport infrastructure) and to build motorways 
on routes that carry little more than 1,000 vehicles per day. Under such a framework, the 
economic crisis can only worsen the mismatch between capacity and traffic with telling 
consequences for government budgets and future generations of tax payers.
In this paper, in addition to presenting evidence of Spain’s overcapacity in all transport 
modes, we analyze the contribution made by institutional and regulatory policies to the existing 
and prospective oversupply and to the mismatch between traffic demand and (transport) capacity 
supply. This is examined both in network and single modes of transportation. By so doing, we 
provide further explanations for an overall design that has permitted the extreme imbalance in the 
present-day system. The Spanish experience, therefore, provides an example of the waste of 
public resources on overambitious programs of investment in underutilized infrastructure. 
Revealing the institutional and regulatory design that provided the mechanisms for such an 
1 Presentation of Spanish proposals for the Trans-European Transportation Network. Ministry of Public 
Works and Transport (Ministerio de Fomento), Madrid, 12 February, 2012. 
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irrational policy should, in itself, be a valuable lesson for any country seeking to modernize and 
improve its transport infrastructure.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a detailed description of the 
extent of the system’s current overcapacity and the mismatch between supply and demand by 
examining the statistics for each transport mode in an international benchmarking assessment. 
Second, we examine the rationale of the regulatory framework supporting the management and 
investment policies for high capacity networks (motorways and HSR) and single point-to-point 
infrastructure (airports and ports). Finally, we present our conclusions and discuss the policy 
implications that can be derived from the extreme case of mismatch between and traffic demand 
and capacity in Spain.
2. Spain’s infrastructure policy: When supply travels far beyond demand
Spain is – by a long way – the country whose infrastructure supply (including both interurban and 
long distance modes) has grown most in recent years. However, demand has not kept pace with 
the increase in supply – truth be told, this mismatch was evident even before the economic crisis 
set in at the end of the last decade. For this reason, the Spanish case has come to be seen –
domestically, as well as in the EU at large – as a paradigmatic case of the wasteful use of public 
resources for the building of infrastructure. This section presents data that allow a comparison to 
be made of the infrastructure supply in Spain with that available throughout the EU and other 
countries. The mismatch between infrastructure and demand is also described in greater detail.
Beginning with surface networks, there can be little doubt that if anything has come to 
characterize Spain’s infrastructure policy since the early 2000s it has been the extension of the 
country’s high-speed rail based on the laying of new tracks and dedicated almost exclusively to 
passenger transport. Successive Spanish governments have boasted of their achievements here 
both domestically as well as in international forums. Indeed, the dedication of massive budgetary 
resources has enabled Spain to build the most extensive (in absolute terms) HSR network in 
Europe and one that is even more extensive than the Chinese network in relative terms. Table 1 
shows the extent of HSR (HSR   	
 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   
  

operate such a service (including the network that is operational and that which is under 
construction).
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(Insert Table 1 around here)
According to information provided by the International Union of Railways (UIC) on 1 April 
2013, eight EU countries and fourteen countries worldwide offered a high-speed rail service. Of 
these, Spain was ranked second (to China) on the basis of the overall number of kilometers of 
network in operation, and ranked a clear first (50% more than its nearest rival France and 
considerably more than all the other countries) on the basis of the number of kilometers per 
million inhabitants. If to these figures we add the number of kilometers under construction, Spain 
further strengthens her leadership with a network that almost doubles France’s in terms of 
kilometers per million inhabitants. 
However, HSR ridership data tell quite a different story with figures for the EU as well as 
for the Asian countries being much higher than those recorded in Spain. For instance, annual 
ridership (number of trips) in Japan is well over 300 million, and over 110 million in France, 
whereas the number of trips on Spain’s HSR network in 2010 was just 16.8 million. A more 
refined view of the massive difference in ridership is obtained from data produced by the 
European Commission (2012), which provides passenger*km -pkm- per country figures for 2010. 
From these, we can obtain the number of pkm for each kilometer of HSR network (that is, a true 
measure of a network’s intensity of use) in the EU countries. Thus, ridership in France is 4.8 times 
higher than Spanish ridership relative to the network length. Relative ridership in Germany is 3.3 
times higher than that of Spain, and in Italy it is 2.2 times higher.2
Spain is also the European Union country with the most extensive motorway network. At 
the end of 2011, it covered a distance of 14,554 km (a figure that does not include dual 
carriageways). In 2009, the last year for which Eurostat provides homogeneous data for almost all 
EU countries, Spain already had 14,021 km of motorway in service, followed by Germany with 
12,813 km. In relative terms (i.e., km of motorways per million inhabitants), Spain, with more than 
300 km per million inhabitants, was ranked well above all other large and medium-sized EU 
countries, as shown in Table 2. The population density of the motorway network in Spain is 
surpassed only by that of Slovenia, Cyprus and Luxembourg, small countries with small 
populations and characteristics that are not really comparable.
These differences are likely to 
have increased in recent years, because low density HSR lines have been opened in Spain, while 
the economic crisis has reduced demand across the whole network. 
2 The passenger-km (pkm) figures in absolute numbers (thousand millions) are: France 51.89, Germany 
23.9; Italy 11.61; Spain 11.72. Recall, for instance, that the length of the Spanish network more than 
doubles that of Italy and Germany.
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(Insert Table 2 around here)
Clearly, the fact of having a more extensive motorway network does not mean that the 
traffic volume will be equally great. And, here, according to data provided by the OECD for road 
passenger traffic in 2008, the total number of passenger*km (pkm) in Italy was 3.6 times higher 
than that of Spain; in Germany it was 2.3 times while France and the UK nearly doubled the 
Spanish statistic.
Unfortunately, there are no equivalent physical measures that allow us to make 
homogeneous cross-country comparisons of airport infrastructure supply. However, Fageda and 
Voltes (2012) have analyzed the average ratio of passenger numbers to the surface area of 
Spanish airport terminals and compared their results with a sample of international airports for 
2010. They show that the mean number of passengers per square meter of terminal in Spain is 
71, while the international mean is 101. Tellingly, sixteen Spanish airports have a mean number of 
passengers per square meter of terminal below 50. 
Data on airport investment obtained from the International Transport Forum (ITF) show 
that, between 2000 and 2009, investment in airports in Spain rose to 16,577 million euro. This 
figure is much higher than investment levels in other EU air markets with more than 100 million 
passengers:3
Data on investment in ports (also obtained from the ITF) show that, between 2000 and 
2009, investment in Spain amounted to 19,733 million euro, which is almost double that invested 
in ports in Italy, more than three times that spent in Germany and six times that in France. By 
combining ITF investment data with figures for the gross weight of seaborne goods handled by a 
country (data provided by Eurostat), we can build a measure for investment relative to port cargo 
traffic in most EU countries.
1.5 times that of Germany (although Germany has more traffic), 1.9 times that of 
France, and 4.8 times that of Italy. Equally, while 46 Spanish airports offer international 
commercial flights, 13 of them handled fewer than 100,000 passengers in 2012. Among these 
airports, only that of La Gomera (Canary Islands) serves an island with low domestic and tourist
demand. As such, this is the only airport that fulfils what might be considered a public service 
obligation to prevent isolation and provide mobility in an insular environment devoid of suitable 
alternatives. 
4
3 International Transport Forum does not provide data on investment in the UK after 2005.
For the period 2005 to 2009, the ratio (investment/port cargo traffic) 
4 International Transport Forum does not provide data on investment in the Netherlands, and data of 
investment in the UK is not available after 2005.
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in Spain was 3.1 euro per ton. This figure is well above that of all other countries in the EU: for 
instance, it is 2.5 times that of Italy, 1.9 times that of Germany, 4.1 times that of France, 3.9 times 
that of Belgium, 14.2 that of Sweden, 8.5 times that of Finland, 4.2 that of Denmark, and 11.4 that 
of Poland.   
As can be seen, overinvestment and the mismatch between supply and demand have 
been the most salient features of Spain’s infrastructure policy, affecting all interurban modes of 
transport. Indeed, Spanish leadership in infrastructure supply is indisputable in all modes. Yet, 
demand has lagged far behind, especially in surface transportation networks. All in all, the policy 
has proven to be badly misguided and its detrimental effects have only been magnified with the 
economic crisis. Below, we analyze the contribution that institutional and regulatory policies have 
made to this oversupply and the mismatch between demand and supply.
3. Institutional and regulatory causes of mismatch
3.1 Network modes
High capacity network modes have received – and, in fact, continue to receive – the largest 
share of Spanish investments in transport infrastructure. As a result, they also provide an obvious 
illustration of the mismatch that exists between infrastructure supply and demand. Taxpayer 
subsidies, together with the massive arrival of European funds for high-speed rail and free 
motorway projects, and the offer of favorable guarantees and the negotiation of risk mitigation 
agreements for private toll motorway projects, are among the main factors fueling this mismatch in 
network modes. 
Motorways
Spain’s motorway network, which is under central government regulation, is characterized by a 
mixed funding model in which 75% of motorways are free, while the remaining 25% are tolled and 
privately operated. This duality can be accounted for by the different models that have been 
adopted in each of the three main waves of motorway investment in the country (see Bel, 1999). 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                               Document de Treball   2013/12 pàg. 9
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                            Working Paper        2013/12 pag. 9
9
Overall, Spain boasts 16,358 km of motorways, the largest high capacity network in per capita 
terms in Europe if we consider countries of a comparable size.5
The first motorways in Spain were opened to traffic under the dictatorship, which chose a 
privately tolled motorway concession model to develop the network.6 Private motorway projects 
involve great uncertainties in terms of demand and cost risks, while private screening can be 
expected to provide profitable projects as it allows the selection of routes on the basis of predicted 
traffic volumes. However, the private advantage of being able to avoid white elephants is only 
possible with the right allocation of risk. In this regard, the dictatorship offered various guarantees 
and risk mitigating mechanisms including exchange rate insurance, an economic-financial 
breakeven guarantee and State-endorsed foreign debt (see Bel, 1999).7 Under these regulations, 
the Motorway Plan projected a frenzied construction effort of 6,430 km of tolled motorways in just 
over a decade. However, the international economic crisis of the seventies was to highlight the 
important mismatch between projected capacity and actual traffic. Eventually, only 2,042 km of 
construction were awarded and by the 1980s only about 1,800 km were actually in operation. 
Moreover, part of the industry had to be rescued through a process of renegotiation and 
nationalization.8
In the late 90s and in the years that followed, the democratic central government continued 
to award new private toll motorway concessions and to offer similarly favorable guarantees. 
However, the most heavily used corridors were by now already covered by previous investments 
– both private and public. Consequently, most of the new motorways built (above all, those 
constructed to provide additional access routes to Madrid’s six existing motorways) are proven 
white elephants – with traffic volumes in some cases (the R2 concession, for example) at just 
34% of expectations. The use of these motorways has been badly undermined by existing free 
parallel motorways, while their profitability has been hit by huge (unexpected) expropriation costs. 
5 This 2012 figure is obtained from the Ministry of Transport and includes free motorways, tolled motorways 
and free dual carriageways, which are technically similar but not the same as free motorways. Note that the 
figure is higher than that reported in Table 2 (section 2), as there we consider a technically homogeneous 
identification of motorways as provided by Eurostat.
6 The first motorway concessions were awarded in 1967 and inaugurated in 1969. The main reasons for
opting for this approach would seem to be 1) fiscal constraints (Bel, 1999); 2) the influence of Mussolini’s 
fascist regime model based similarly on private concessions (Bel, 2012); and, 3) the advantage of user 
charges along tourist corridors, thus transferring part of the cost to foreigners (Puncel, 1996).
7 In spite of regulations favoring foreign investments, concessionaires were solely domestic. Interest in 
attracting capital from international financial markets was a strategy used to improve the Spanish balance of 
payments. Specifically, exchange rate insurance was provided to facilitate foreign private investment.
8 The government bailed out those concessions experiencing the greatest problems (1) by nationalizing 
three concessions (Atlántico, Astur-Leonesa and Navarra) in 1984 and (2) by restructuring the same 
Decree-Law governing the sector and encouraging the absorption of two other problematic concessions by 
the industry’s main concessionaires (ACESA and AUMAR) on the most profitable routes. In return, the 
government renegotiated the corresponding contract durations.
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Vasallo and Baeza (2011) report a significant bias towards the overestimation of traffic volumes 
on Spanish toll motorways. They argue that such overestimation is a strategic move given the 
possibilities for renegotiating concessions. Indeed, the State has been shown to have secured 
liabilities and is currently negotiating to rescue concessionaires that find themselves in trouble 
having accumulated debts of more than 3,500 million euro.
The free motorway network is fully funded from the government budget and received its latest 
boost from large scale investment programs between 1984 and 1993. The switch from toll to free 
motorways was adopted in part because private initiative was unable to provide coverage in 
regions with low traffic volumes. Motorway plans in this period acquired a centralized design, 
connecting Madrid to provinces in the periphery. The impressive growth in levels of investment 
was possible in part to the massive arrival of European funds that targeted specific regions, but 
without any consideration of traffic volume. Unlike the toll motorways, this free network has been 
extended constantly since 1984. 
Since 1993, however, Spanish governments have not operated a strategic plan for the 
country’s motorways. Only selected projects have been presented in a number of investment 
programs, but no specific criterion has been applied as regards capacity enlargements. 
Technically, it is generally accepted that conventional roads should be converted into high 
capacity roads when they reach an average daily traffic of around 15,000 vehicles – or 10,000 
when congestion is severe or heavy traffic represents a share of 15% or more. Yet, in Spain, 
several roads have been converted into motorways with traffic volumes below 2,000 vehicles per 
day – examples include the routes Cuenca-Teruel (1,399 daily vehicles), Huelva-Zafra (1,409 
daily vehicles) and Alcolea del Pilar-Caminreal (1,975 daily vehicles). There are at least five more 
such enlargement projects with daily traffic volumes below 4,000 vehicles.9
Regulatory prices on toll motorways are based on a price cap rule introduced in 2001, which in 
turn is based on the differences between projected and actual traffic on each specific motorway 
(See Albalate, Bel and Fageda, 2009).10 However, such price regulation has not played a 
significant role in the overinvestment bias given that the largest part of the network is free, which 
produces well-known incentives to overinvest. Additional interpretations concern short-term 
motivations, such as electoral productivity (Castells and Solé, 2005), and long-term motivations, 
such as centralization (Albalate, Bel and Fageda, 2012). 
9 See Macias and Aguilera (2013) for an extensive list of low traffic conventional roads being converted into 
free motorways in Spain in 2013.
10 This price cap regulation substituted the modification in tolls linked to 95% of the Retail Price Index.
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High-Speed Rail
High-speed rail has been at the heart of Spain’s transport policy. Even in the 2013 budget –
which included major cuts in social benefits – HSR was allocated 3,302 million euro, 71% of all 
investment for railways and 33% of overall investment. The Strategic Plan of Transport 
Infrastructure (PEIT, 2004) foresaw that 43.7% of total investment between 2005 and 2020 was to 
be dedicated to intercity rail, with a particular emphasis on high-speed rail, which was expected to 
receive a third of the Ministry’s total investments. The new Transport Infrastructure Plan (PITVI, 
2012), replacing the previous one, retains intercity rail investment at 39% of the total. It also 
confirms the general allocation of funding for high speed rail projects countrywide. The plan 
reflects the fact that since the year 2000, the main objective of Spain’s transport policy has been 
to provide an HSR link between the political capital and all provincial capitals11 – a  policy shared 
by the two main political parties that have ruled the country over the last few decades. This 
situation accounts for the fact that Spain continues to top the table in terms of new HSR 
construction (See Table 1 above), even when there is overwhelming evidence of the mismatch 
between supply and demand on the lines already in operation. Indeed, the market share of the rail 
mode in passenger-km stood at just 5.2% in 2011.12
Such a mismatch cannot be supported by private initiative. Both the infrastructure and the 
service are managed by publicly owned monopolies. There is a vertical accounting separation 
between the manager of the infrastructure (ADIF) and the manager of the services (RENFE), with 
both corporations being controlled by the Ministry of Transport.
Competition is not allowed among passenger traffic in Spain and the characteristics of the 
country’s infrastructure – distinct from those of conventional railways – are incompatible with 
freight transport. Indeed, high-speed rail links have concentrated all of Spain’s modernization 
efforts in the railway sector, with no interest for freight transport, which today suffers severe 
bottlenecks along the main corridors. As a result, Spain’s freight rail transport presents one of the 
lowest (and decreasing) market shares in Europe, standing at just 2.5%.13
11 This objective was first introduced by President José María Aznar in the investiture debate preceding the 
2000-2004 legislation (Diario de sesiones del Congreso, 2000, nº.2, [April 25] p.29.
As such this is the 
principal opportunity cost of investment efforts in passenger oriented high-speed rail, which 
should come as no surprise if we consider that ports and UIC-gauge railways have yet to be 
linked up in Spain. Indeed, the first project of this kind did not take place until 2012, when the Port 
of Barcelona was connected with a minor single dedicated track. 
12 Estimates provided by the Ministry of Transport in the Transport Infrastructure Plan (PITVI) 2012-2024, 
part II, p.3.
13 Estimates offered by the Ministry of Transport in the Transport Infrastructure Plan (PITVI) 2012-2024, 
part II, p. 5.
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Taxpayers, together with European funds (which account for around a quarter of project 
investments), have borne the brunt of the expense of the high-speed rail program (See Albalate 
and Bel, 2012).14 This has come about, first, because the fees paid for the use of infrastructure do 
not fully cover the maintenance of both the network and train stations. As a result, the 
infrastructure has to be fully subsidized, as does the rolling stock in part (even though it was 
purchased by RENFE). Second, it reflects the fact that, during the early years of operation, prices 
were heavily subsidized. In this regard, the European Commission prohibited subsidies to cover 
operating losses on RENFE’s long distance services, including its high-speed rail lines, in 2009. 
This aid had amounted to € 248 million in 2007, and would have risen to to € 400 million in later 
years. None of the high speed lines fulfills public service obligations. 
3.2 Single facilities
In Spain, single transport facilities are characterized by a centralized management model of 
publicly owned monopolies – AENA aeropuertos for airports and Puertos del Estado for ports –
under central government control. Although ports and airports are two types of infrastructure that 
have a local economic influence within their respective hinterlands and which are funded by user 
payments (as a system), the main management decisions are taken by centralized institutions 
that implement cross-subsidy schemes between business units and price regulations that do not 
reflect their individual costs. These two mechanisms provide a regulatory framework that 
facilitates overcapacity (due to a scale of investment that would not be possible if it depended 
solely on their individual revenues) leading to a sizeable mismatch between infrastructure supply 
and demand (which, furthermore, is not justified by public service obligations).   
Airports 
AENA manages 47 of the 48 airports with commercial traffic in Spain.15
14 It is worth recalling that because of Spain’s relief and urban density, the average construction costs of the 
HSR network have been lower than those in other European countries, and well below those in Italy (See 
Beria and Grimaldi, 2011).
This contrasts with the 
present situation in other European countries with various large airports, such as France, United 
15 The only commercial airport not managed by AENA is Lleida-Alguaire, a small airport that handled just 
33,041 passengers in 2012. A further three airports, which do not currently carry commercial traffic, are not 
managed by AENA.
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Kingdom, Germany and Italy, where airports are managed on an individual basis by either public 
or private firms (for more details, see Bel and Fageda, 2010).16
AENA is the owner of all the facilities provided by Spain’s airports and it controls all the 
financial resources generated by them. All investment plans are drawn up jointly between AENA 
and the Ministry of Transport, with airport charges being fixed by the Spanish Parliament. All other 
relevant decisions regarding airport management are made by AENA, including those related to 
the undertaking of retail activities, the allocation of slots, check-in counters and airline gates.  
The centralized management system means that Spanish airports are unable to compete with 
each other to attract airline services, as typically occurs in other European countries. Furthermore, 
any financial losses are compensated through a cross-subsidy system. Here, Bel and Fageda
(2009) show that the cross-subsidy system is not necessarily driven by a criterion of solidarity as it 
is usually claimed. On the contrary, a significant positive correlation can be found between 
investments and income per capita, leading to a larger allocation of the resources raised by 
profitable airports to the richest territories.
As regards revenues, Law 25/1998 fixed the initial values for current aeronautical charges (the 
fees for landing and aircraft parking, and for terminal use, etc.) and other fees, including car 
parking and the retail activities undertaken by AENA. The company operates four airport 
categories and sets aeronautical charges accordingly (note that within the same category, price 
differences are minimal). The airports of Madrid and Barcelona are in the first category, the main 
tourist airports comprise the second, while the other two categories are made up of the airports 
handling lower traffic volumes. This discrete categorization of regulation, however, fails to allow 
prices to reflect individual costs, and as such is a significant source of inefficiency.
Any changes to these charges proposed by AENA must receive the approval of the Spanish 
Parliament. Thus, in theory, airport charges are based on the total costs of all the airports
managed by AENA; however, in practice, these charges are approved by Parliament, so they are 
adjusted annually in line with the charges made for other public services (except in 2011 and 
2012 when airport charges in Madrid and Barcelona were increased substantially in relation to 
those in place at the other airports because of the huge investment debts accumulated in 
Barcelona and, above all, in Madrid). Thus, while charges are strictly regulated, they do not 
necessarily cover costs.   
16 Exceptions do exist; thus airports located in the same urban area tend to be managed by one single firm. 
This is the case of airports in Paris, Rome and Milan and it was the case of those in London and Glasgow 
before the break-up of BAA airports.
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Thus, it should be noted that AENA has recorded financial losses since 2007, making it the 
airport operator reporting the largest deficit in the world (Bel and Fageda, 2011). AENA’s current 
debt stands at more than 14,000 thousand million euros. In 2011, only ten airports were profitable 
and each of them moves more than four million passengers per year. This contrasts starkly with 
reports for other European airports where the traffic profitability threshold can be as low as one 
million passengers (European Commission, 2002).
In short, the poor financial performance of Spanish airports can be attributed to a lack of 
competition, the cross-subsidy system and the absence of incentives to be cost efficient. All these 
factors, derived from the centralized management system, have a detrimental impact on the 
financial accounts of Spanish airports and encourage the tendency to over-invest, which is 
perhaps the main factor accounting for AENA’s current financial distress. 
Ports
Public ownership and centralized decision-making on such matters as investment and prices also 
characterize Spain’s ports.17 However, the Port Authorities have a greater degree of financial 
autonomy than that enjoyed by the airports since here investments are more closely linked to the 
amount of revenues that each port generates individually. Furthermore, privately-owned terminals, 
with high degrees of independence from the Port Authorities, are permitted on port premises.18
The two main agencies managing the ports of Spain are Puertos del Estado and the Port 
Authorities. Puertos del Estado is a state-owned company whose main objectives are to 
coordinate operations and to approve the Port Authorities’ investment plans. The company is 
financed by four per cent of the total revenues of each Port Authority located on the mainland and 
two per cent of the revenues of ports situated on islands, and in Ceuta and Melilla.  
Spain has 28 Port Authorities managing a total of 47 ports.19
17 In contrast, port authorities in Northern Europe are generally managed individually by public firms and on  
a strong commercial basis.
The Port Authorities  are public 
institutions that have their own legal structure and a president appointed by the regional 
Government. The president’s role is to propose investment plans and establish concession 
contracts with the companies that operate in the terminal. All the Port Authorities are financed by 
property income and port charges that are paid by terminal operators and shipping firms. The 
18 There have been several changes in the legislation regulating port management in Spain since the early 
nineties (see Castillo-Manzano et al., 2008, for details)
19 Other minor non-commercial ports are subject to regional regulation.
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initial values of port charges are fixed by law and the annual update is approved in provisions 
accompanying the General Budget Law. No formal link has been established between charges 
and costs, although the Port Authorities are generally profitable. 
The regulations provide some scope for price competition through the use of two tools: a 
correction coefficient and discounts. The correction coefficient is the percentage that each Port 
Authority can apply in order to modify the fee paid by the shipping companies. The main feature of 
the correction coefficient is that it involves a “regulation of maximum profits”. Thus, a Port 
Authority with profit levels higher than the national mean has to lower its prices, while a Port 
Authority with lower profit levels has to increase its prices. Such a regulatory measure however 
can cause an economic distortion, as the price setting is not necessarily related to the costs of 
each Port Authority. The second tool to promote competition comprises the discounts that Port 
Authorities can apply under certain conditions (regulated by law) to terminal operators and 
shipping companies. For each Port Authority, the regulation fixes an upper limit, this being the 
maximum amount that discounts can represent as a share of the port’s total revenue. 
Ports in Spain can also receive resources from the “Inter-port Compensation Fund”, which 
sees resources being transferred between ports to compensate for disadvantageous situations 
arising from hinterland limitations or island locations, and to improve the ports’  road and rail 
accessibility. To finance this fund, each Port Authority has to contribute up to 12 per cent of their 
income. 
However, Fageda and González-Aregall (forthcoming) show that the current regulation of port 
charges does little to foster price competition, while Castillo-Manzano and Fageda (forthcoming) 
report a tendency towards over-investment in the Spanish port system. Since the early nineties, 
investment in the Spanish port system has multiplied three-fold (after controlling for inflation). Port 
Authorities have been accruing debt with financial institutions at a double-digit annual growth rate, 
so that the accumulated debt more than doubles the total annual revenue for the whole port 
system. In a similar vein, Soraya-Hidalgo et al. (2013) show, by estimating a cost-function for the 
1986-2005 period, that most Spanish ports are operating at over-capacity. Hence, the 
combination of weak price competition and the financial autonomy of the Port Authorities seem to 
have led to capacity competition and the resulting overcapacity of the Spanish port system. 
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4. Discussion and Policy Implications
We have shown that Spain’s transport policy in recent years has been characterized by a sizeable 
mismatch between capacity investment and traffic demand. In this instance, the mismatch cannot 
be attributed to problems of isolation or accessibility, but rather to programs of public investment 
and regulatory and institutional mechanisms that have actively favored overcapacity. Of further 
concern is the fact that no major reform is foreseen in either current or prospective policies for 
limiting this overcapacity. Indeed, the current economic crisis and the fiscal constraints being 
imposed by the European institutions do nothing to prevent the extension of large expensive 
transport projects that continue to be justified under the same policies as those adopted in the 
recent past.
As has been argued, today’s network modes are the outcome of large investment 
programs, funded primarily from the public budget, and which have failed to take into 
consideration future traffic forecasts. Even in the case of private toll motorways, the institutional 
and regulatory design of concession contracts (and their offer of generalized guarantees) has 
mitigated the importance of demand risk in the valuation of projects, resulting in similar white 
elephant projects to those produced by the Government in its free motorway programs. In the 
case of single infrastructure, the  main problems driving overcapacity can be identified as (1) 
institutional – due to the centralization of management under publicly owned corporations 
controlled by the central government; and, (2) regulatory – due to the use of price regulations 
based on cross-subsidy schemes not justified by public service obligations. 
Reforming transport policy in Spain is urgent; yet, recent developments appear to show 
that current policies are limitless, even though they are having a negative impact on both current 
and future generations. What is required are measures that seek to link investment and capacity 
to different service delivery thresholds. This means accommodating investment projects and the 
modernization of each mode – gradually, when indivisibilities do not apply – to the demand 
expectations of non-commercial infrastructure. In the case of commercial infrastructure it is 
imperative that the institutional and regulatory framework be reformed. In this regard, the 
management of these units should be undertaken on an individual basis and price regulations 
need to be reformed so as to ensure that that the fees charged meet costs. However, this will only 
be possible if the reforms provide a (new) regulation of the public policy process.
Spain is the only example among the large and medium-sized countries of the OECD in 
which absolutely all interurban transportation modes are under central government control. 
Regulation and institutional designs are all determined by the Ministry of Transport (either directly 
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by the Ministry or indirectly by corporate companies owned by the Ministry) and, as shown, they 
have promoted overinvestment. Internationally no executive enjoys a comparable concentration of 
powers in the transport sector. Thus, institutional reforms need to consider the establishment of 
an independent regulatory agency for transport, one that is outside central government control. 
This is of pressing interest; especially, if we bear in mind that the Ministry of Transport itself is 
aware of the lack of correlation between investment and growth in demand; yet, the political 
precepts consider an equal endowment of infrastructures (in terms of both quantity and quality) to 
guarantee equality between the citizens of different regions.
Finally, it is worth remembering that over-investment in Spain’s infrastructure has been heavily 
supported by the huge subsidies assigned to it by the European Union. As such, the Spanish 
case illustrates the existence of the poorly planned effects of European policy, which is guilty of 
having paid little attention to the economic rationality of its co-financed projects. Moreover, 
European policy actually encourages the planning of major infrastructure projects since in this 
way countries stand a better chance of receiving all their pre-allocated subsidies. Given this state 
of affairs, regulatory reform of infrastructure policy at the EU level would also be highly beneficial.
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Km HSR / Million 
people
Km HSR operation 
+ construction
Km HSR (op+cons) 
/ Million people
Spain 2192 47 3739 79
France 2036 31 2793 43
Belgium 209 19 209 19
Japan 2087 16 2869 23
Italy 923 16 923 16
Taiwan 345 15 345 15
Germany 1019 12 1447 18
Austria 93 11 93 11
South Korea 412 8 598 12
Netherlands 120 7 120 7
China 8359 6 14604 11
Turkey 444 6 991 13
Switzerland 35 4 107 13
United Kingdom 113 2 113 2
Source: HSR networks, from International Union of Railways (UIC). Population, from Eurostat and different national sources. Info 
downloaded on May 8, 2013  
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Table 2. Motorways (free and tolled) in the European Union (2009)





















Czech Republic 729 70






Source: European Commission (2012, p. 75). Eurostat for Latvia and  Malta, an also for population.
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